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The main purpose of the present research is the examining Determinants of corporate governance 
disclosure in the Tehran Stock Exchange. Correlational research methodology used in this study 
and the types of research is descriptive and also it is an Expose-Facto research. The population of 
the study was all company that listed in Tehran Stock Exchange.  According to Cochran 
sampling, the sample size of this research was set at 200 that selected simple (They were 
includes 200 companies in 40 industry groups). In order to analyze the data resulted from 
collected questionnaires deductive and descriptive statistical methods are used. The results K-S 
Test shows the test distribution is not Normal. So re-running the test and the results in Table (3) 
is observed that a significant amount of initial data from which the natural logarithm (Ln (V)) 
has been more than 0.50, therefore, with a 0.95 Confidence level, data distributions are normal. 
So we can use Multi Regression to test the hypothesis of the research. In order to determine the 
relationship between the variables of the study, the SPSS tool has been used. Findings show that 
board composition the size of the board, role duality, percentage ownership of institutional 
shareholders, number of shareholders and despite internal auditors have impact on disclosure of 
corporate governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance practices in the Iran have received increasing attention. In this study, we 
use a scorecard developed to assess the corporate governance of Iran listed companies. It 
provides a comprehensive measure of the extent to which a company has adopted international 
best practices in corporate governance, as disclosed in their corporate governance disclosures. 
Many papers have dealt with the determinants of corporate governance. Weisbach (1988) and 
                                                             
1 Corresponding Author  




Klein (2002) look into the incentives of insiders and show that there exists a negative correlation 
between the ownership of managers and the proportion of outside directors on the boards of 
directors, or on audit committees. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) claim that CEO exercises 
major influence on the selection of new directors when the ownership distribution of his firm is 
dispersed, while it is the controlling shareholder under concentrated ownership structures. 
Recently, Durnev and Kim (2003) show that firms with good investment opportunity, higher 
sales growth rates and higher dependency on external financing would maintain a better 
corporate governance not to lose those good investment opportunities. However, their focus is 
not on the incentives of controlling shareholders, and they use governance scores, as evaluated 
by outside institutions, as a proxy for corporate governance. 
Corporate governance based on existing theories and empirical results, and identifies variables 
that will be used to test the hypotheses.  
1- Ownership and Corporate Governance  
Ownership structure is a part of corporate governance in its broad sense, and it also affects other 
elements of corporate governance. Controlling shareholders have a strong incentive to monitor 
the management of firms and can be the most important part of corporate governance. Existing 
theories and empirical studies that analyze ownership structure generally identify block 
shareholders such as corporate shareholders, institutional investors and financial institutions as 
monitors in addition to controlling shareholders (Eunjung and Kyung, 2004). 
2- Business Structure and Corporate Governance  
Another major factor that can affect the governance structure of a firm is business structure, and 
conglomerates have been a focus of interest since they offer a very comfortable environment for 
controlling shareholders to pursue their own benefits through transactions among affiliated firms. 
Tunneling, as it is known in the literature, has been widely reported in European conglomerates 
by Johnson, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (2002), and also in Korean conglomerates 
by Bae, Kang and Kim (2002). A conglomerate business structure also allows controlling 
shareholders to maintain their control through affiliated ownerships.  
3- Firm Size and Corporate Governance  
Since governance mechanisms consume corporate resources. Larger firms would have better 
corporate governance, and we include asset size as a control variable. Most of the monitoring 
system such as the board of directors, internal control system, and financial reporting and 
disclosure system incur financial costs, most of which are of a fixed component and can be borne 
more efficiently by larger firms. The more complicated business structure of large firms may 
also require better corporate governance (Eunjung and Kyung, 2004).  
4- Other Financial Characteristics and Corporate Governance  
Some financial characteristics would affect the governance decision and need to be controlled. 
Control variables include represent profitability, liquidity, financial structure and growth rates of 
firms. The effects of profitability on corporate governance may be two way. High profitability 
implies a good capability of management and so monitoring them may not be necessary. On the 
other hand, high profitability means the company can afford a better governance system. Outside 
investors may also demand better governance as they have a greater economic stake to lose 
(Eunjung and Kyung, 2004).  
 
 




5- Board Composition  
Board composition is defined as ‘the proportion of outside directors to the total number of 
directors’ (Shamser and Annuar, 1993, p.44), thereby making a distinction between executive 
and non-executive directors. There are two views on this issue – those who argue for more non-
executive directors on boards and those who favor more executive directors on boards.  
6- Role Duality  
One aspect of corporate governance which has given rise to concern is the ‘dominant 
personality’ phenomenon and this was found to be associated with poor disclosure (Forker, 
1992). This phenomenon also includes role duality, when the chief executive officer (CEO) or 
managing director is also the chair of the board. There are two views regarding this issue. 
Proponents of agency theory argue for separation of the two roles because this would provide the 
essential checks and balances over managements’ performance. Furthermore, when the CEO is 
also the chair, the board’s effectiveness in performing its governing function will be at stake 
because role duality concentrates power so that the CEO will be able to control board meetings, 
the selection of agenda items, as well as the selection of board members. Among those who 
argue for separation of the two roles include Argenti (1976), Donaldson and Davis (1991), 
Shamsher and Annuar (1993) and Blackburn (1994).  
7- Cross-directorships  
Another issue often discussed in the corporate governance literature is ‘cross-directorships’ 
which refers to the situation where directors (regardless of executive or non-executive) sit on 
more than one board. It has been suggested in the literature that this will help in making 
information more transparent as comparisons can be made from knowledge of other 
organisations (Dahya et al., 1996).  
In this paper, we investigate whether controlling shareholders purposefully intervene in the early 
stage of determining the corporate governance structure of their firms and succeed to manipulate 
it to their advantage. Our conjecture is that controlling shareholders would affect the governance 
structure of their firm since they usually control the board of directors, which has the ultimate 
power to decide the overall structure of corporate governance. In this sense, controlling 
shareholders of a firm with a concentrated ownership structure are harder to be monitored or 
checked for their misbehavior than are professional managers.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
The main purpose of the present research is the examining Determinants of corporate governance 
disclosure in the Tehran Stock Exchange. Correlational research methodology used in this study 
and the types of research is descriptive and also it is an Expose-Facto research. 
The population of the study was all company that listed in Tehran Stock Exchange.  According 
to Cochran sampling, the sample size of this research was set at 200 that selected simple (They 
were includes 200 companies in 40 industry groups). 
Table 3-1: Sample selection based on the limitations of the research  
Sampling procedures Number of 
Company 
Accepted companies in Tehran stock exchange till 2012 478 
Fiscal year is not 19st March. 87 
Financial intermediation and insurance companies 38 




Companies that were operating over a four-month hiatus 132 
Companies that their information is not available or have 
been removed from the stock exchange 
149 
The remaining firms in the sample 40 
In order to analyze the data resulted from collected questionnaires deductive and descriptive 
statistical methods are used. The results K-S Test shows the test distribution is not Normal.  
Table 2: K-S Test results 
 CGDI BC BS INST NShH LVG LSIZE 


























Absolute .330 .349 .411 .380 .121 .341 .476 
Positive .321 .298 .411 .380 .121 .341 .476 
Negative -.330 -.349 -.386 -.363 -.113 -.322 -.425 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Z 
7.049 7.439 9.228 8.529 2.701 7.645 10.604 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
The results of K-S Test shows that the test distribution is not normal. So re-running the test and 
the results in Table (3) is observed that a significant amount of initial data from which the natural 
logarithm (Ln (V)) has been more than 0.50, therefore, with a 0.95 Confidence level, data 
distributions are normal.  
Table 3: re-running the test results 
 CGDI BC BS INST NShH LVG LSIZE 
N 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.085 .125 .958 .088 .325 .149 .069 
So we can use Multi Regression to test the hypothesis of the research. In order to determine the 
relationship between the variables of the study, the SPSS tool has been used. 
 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION  
A) Deductive Results  










































































CGDI  200  28  47  29.8  .84  5.26  1.86  .14  3.92  .27  
BC 200  .18  .86  .59  1.26  1.20  3.63  .28  16  .16  




BS  200  5  11  6.4  1.33  1.20  3.66  .21 17.50  .2  
INST  200  .29  0.98  .53  .20  .28  1.58  .39 5.53  .33  
NShH  200  70000  190000  89000  5800  73000  6.61  .88 3.54  .69  
LVG  200  1.03  1.889  .547  1.67  2.73  1.29  .35 4.59  .55  
LSIZE  200  2.01  3.10  .97  1.63  .50  4.12  .14 1.22  .39  
PRO  200  .40  .81  .10  .29  2.212  1.64  .14 5.27  .27  
 
B) Hypotheses Results 
In this paper we have six main hypotheses. The statistical way of analysis of hypotheses is two 
ways, H1 is acceptance of hypothesis and H0 is rejecting of hypothesis. In other words, it means 
that H1 has positive meaning and H0 has no meaning. 
In order to select one of the methods panel data or data compilation, the F-statistic is used. 
Table 5: F test for multiple regression model 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 29.316404 (38.79) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 24.706811 40 0.0000 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0. 759014 2. 375496 0.240940 0.0004 
BC 0.293902 0.117155 2.508668 0.0137 
BS 15.28767 10.02566 1.706406 0.0007 
Duality 0. 892239 0. 041162 1.000036 0.0082 
INST 0. 771564 1. 374455 0.466375 0. 4151 
NShH 10. 72867 7.6466 1.  0 2506 0. 3607 
IntAu 0. 165794 3.749052 0. 104090 0. 2844 
LVG 2. 755258 7.079929 0. 537132 0. 7018 
LSIZE 18. 71996 23. 42381 0.824047 0. 0049 
PRO 0.722509 0.098104 7.364721 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0. 073513    Mean dependent var 76.12941 
Adjusted R-squared 0.176778    S.D. dependent var 461569.6 
S.E. of regression 18. 24749    Akaike info criterion 1328949. 
Sum squared resid 31239.83    Schwarz criterion 30.36585 
Log likelihood 405.2859    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30.43800 
F-statistic 3. 400050    Durbin-Watson stat 30.39469 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.029345    
          




According to the above results, the statistical probability F (0.0001) is rejected the null 
hypothesis and is suitable for panel data. 
After the F test the null hypothesis is rejected, the question is which one of the ways the 
relationship can be in the form of fixed or random effects, can be examined. The Hausman test 
determines. 




Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 8.583865 7 0.2839 
     
     Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     BC 0.040865 0.065170 0.000228 0.0006 
BS 2.823274 2.809779 0. 049916 0.0001 
Duality 0.007813 0.07398 0.003100 0.0002 
INST 0.51029 6.0144446 1.266124 0.0087 
NShH 1.454082 1.241798 1.626628 0.0078 
IntAu 6.514414 6.040296 1.287624 0.0061 
LVG 17.539641 82.6116 4560.32083 0.00567 
LSIZE 4961.0774 438.380082 519101.393 0.0002 
PRO 1. 085365 1. 435594 0.003270 0.0055 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 177.5396 593.1188 0.299332 0.7650 
CGDI 496531.1 166024.7 2.990705 0.0031 
BC -117693.5 32647.88 -3.604937 0.0004 
BS 728236.4 49169.75 14.81066 0.0000 
Duality 0.186102 0.089311 2.083742 0.0383 
INST 1.536085 0.956214 1.606424 0.1122 
NShH -6022591. 471968.9 -12.76057 0.0000 
IntAu 107.1962 688.3811 0.155722 0.8764 
LVG 438825.1 175714.9 2.497369 0.0130 
LSIZE -109287.7 25749.83 -4.244209 0.0000 
PRO 505788.7 36552.94 13.83716 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.570692    Mean dependent var 456619.6 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.488998    S.D. dependent var 1894329. 
S.E. of 79451.90    Akaike info criterion 30. 83655 






resid 2.70E+14    Schwarz criterion 40. 38300 
Log likelihood 1475.890    Hannan-Quinn criter. 30. 46399 
F-statistic 72.75129    Durbin-Watson stat 1.497007 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
          Thus, according to the results of the above table, the null hypothesis at 95% confidence level 
(using random effects) regression does not reject the random effects will be estimation 
procedure. 
Table 6 shows that Multi Regression analysis has been done in order to determine independent 
variable and dependent variable.  
Table 7: Multi Regression of the independent and dependent variables 
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
     
     C 3208653. 688648.2 14.09600 0.0000
BC 166431.1 909024.7 6. 592507 0.0031
BS 647193.5 32176.88 -3.604937 0.0004
Duality 728236.4 49169.75 14.81066 0.0000
INST 0.186102 0.089311 2.083742 0.0083
NShH 1882540. 119185.1 15.79510 0.0000
IntAu 1.234514 0.334076 3.695311 0.0003
LVG 2808.7002 2500.4415 7554935.6 0.0000
LSIZE 0.121583 0.233585 0.006957 0.0000
PRO 117693.5 32647.88 3.604937 0.0004
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho  
     
     Cross-section random 8217.200 0.8611
Idiosyncratic random 6.706135 0. 1328
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.159163    Mean dependent var 11.93120 
Adjusted R-
squared 0. 71 0513    S.D. dependent var 47. 0156 
S.E. of regression 6. 875841    Sum squared resid 1344. 658 
F-statistic 1. 307605    Durbin-Watson stat 1. 760818 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.089120    
  
First hypothesis: There is a relationship between board composition and disclosure of corporate 
governance. According to the table 6, the p-value (0.0031) is little than 0.05. It means that board 
composition has impact on disclosure of corporate governance the companies that accepted at 
Tehran stock exchange.  





Second hypothesis: There is a relationship between the size of the board and disclosure of 
corporate governance. According to the table 6, the p-value (0.0004) is little than 0.05. It means 
that the size of the board has impact on disclosure of corporate governance the companies that 
accepted at Tehran stock exchange.  
 
Third hypothesis: There is a relationship between role duality and disclosure of corporate 
governance. According to the table 6, the p-value (0.0000) is little than 0.05. It means that role 
duality has impact on disclosure of corporate governance the companies that accepted at Tehran 
stock exchange.  
 
Forth hypothesis: There is a relationship between percentage ownership of institutional 
shareholders and disclosure of corporate governance. According to the table 6, the p-value 
(0.0083) is little than 0.05. It means that percentage ownership of institutional shareholders has 
impact on disclosure of corporate governance the companies that accepted at Tehran stock 
exchange.  
 
Fifth hypothesis: There is a relationship between number of shareholders and disclosure of 
corporate governance. According to the table 6, the p-value (0.0000) is little than 0.05. It means 
that number of shareholders has impact on disclosure of corporate governance the companies 
that accepted at Tehran stock exchange.  
 
Sixth hypothesis: There is a relationship between despite internal auditors and disclosure of 
corporate governance. According to the table 6, the p-value (0.0000) is little than 0.05. It means 
that despite internal auditors has impact on disclosure of corporate governance the companies 
that accepted at Tehran stock exchange.  
Findings show that board composition the size of the board, role duality, percentage ownership 
of institutional shareholders, number of shareholders and despite internal auditors have impact 
on disclosure of corporate governance. 
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